for PART I
Brigham Young’s Indian Policy
The Massacre at Mountain Meadows very clearly portrays the massacre as a locally planned and executed affair. While Brigham Young was not responsible for providing a proximal cause, I think it is fair to analyze how some of his actions and policies may have had unintended and indirect consequences for setting the stage. Perhaps the most unfortunate thing Brigham did was to threaten to shirk in his role as a peacemaker between obnoxious wagon trains and the Native Americans who suffered from such contact.
The emigrants would trespass through Indian lands, deplete resources such as grazing and game, shoot at Indians just for target practice, and enter into skirmishes over stolen property. Mormon mediators, under Brigham Young’s direction as Superintendant of Indian Affairs, would placate the Indians on the behalf of the emigrants by offering them Mormon goods (a manifestation of the feed ’em, don’t fight ’em mentality). Ungrateful wagon train members, though happy to make it through Utah alive, would not reimburse Young and the Mormons for their substantial services. Neither did the federal government [1].
A turning point came in mid-August when the mediation policy backfired and emigrants incited Indians along the northern route to nearly turn on the Mormons. Brigham then made public threats that the coming war would prevent the Mormons from mediating and it was likely that the Indians—left to themselves—would fatally plunder from wagon trains. The authors suggest that the news would have arrived by word of mouth to southern Utah just as the Baker/Fancher train was passing through.[2] The letter Haslam carried appears to confirm this new laissez faire stance in regards to letting the Indians do as they please [3]. However, I do not think that Brigham expected his threat to be carried out so soon.[4] Firstly, he did not distribute an official letter to all the various local territorial leaders, like he did with his war policies (such as cultivating an alliance with the Indians, stockpiling grain and ammunition, or refusing the sell of such to emigrants) [5]. Secondly the book gives an example where the Mormons continued to act as pacifying mediators involving the train immediately following the Baker/Fancher train along the southern route [6].
If this reconstruction is correct, Haight and Lee initially made the decision to go beyond the official tactic of allying with Indians against military attacks and even beyond a non-interventionist stance. They sought to instigate, assist, and lead the Indians to carry out an attack on innocent bystanders [7]. Haight put the wheels in motion for the massacre against the wishes of his superior officer, William Dame [8].
The authors’ tight chronology convincingly demonstrates that Brigham Young’s largely unsuccessful negotiations with Indian tribal leaders to form an alliance was irrelevant to the tragic events in southern Utah [9]. Even if one reads the Huntington diaries as promoting the theft of grain and cattle from non-military convoys as the authors do, it was Brigham’s style to give “fair warning” [10]. Young later denounced the massacre in the strongest possible terms [11].
Notes
[1] Most of the information in this paragraph can be found on p. 84-5 and 94-100. For federal governmental concern over a possible Mormon-Indian alliance leading up to Buchanan’s Blunder see Thomas G. Alexander, “Carpetbaggers, Reprobates, and Liars: Federal Judges and the Utah War (1857-58).” The Historian 70 (Summer 2008): 209-38 reviewed here.
[2] see especially p. 137 and 175
[3] Brigham Young’s response to the misinformation fed him by Isaac Haight is covered on p. 181-6
[4] It should be noted that the book does not make this argument.
[5] On Brigham Young’s written orders in early August see M@MM 47-50. George A. Smith was selected to carry the message through on a tour through southern Utah.
[6] See M@MM 175-7. The incident will be further covered in another installment of this review.
[7] Haight and Lee’s initial planning session is covered on 141-145. Earlier the authors non-commitally write “Haight’s interpretation of the [new Indian] policy may have influenced his next decision.” (p. 137 emphasis mine)
[8] M@MM 132-6 Haight wanted Dames’ permission to use the Nauvoo Legion to punish some members of Fancher/Baker train for making death threats. Dame declined reportedly writing “words are but wind.”
[9] M@MM 145-7. The authors take a rare detour to dispute a prior study implicating Brigham Young by linking these discussions to the massacre. Other contrary reactions to this theory can be found here, here, here, and here.
[10] M@MM 100
[11] The occasion I have in mind is found here.
There are transactions that are too horrible for me to contemplate.
The massacre at Haun’s mill, and that of Joseph and Hyrum Smith, and the Mountain Meadow’s massacre and the murder of Dr. Robinson are of this character. I cannot think that there are beings upon the earth who have any claim to the sentiments and feelings which dwell in the breasts of civilized men who could be guilty of such atrocities; and it is hard to suppose that even savages would be capable of performing such inhuman acts.
See MMM 135 for evidence that Brigham would not have accepted a justification based on avenging the “Blood of the prophets.” However Brigham’s reaction to the massacre varied at times based on what information and misinformation he received as outlined in Alexander’s Arrington lecture which I highlighted here.
I think it is naïve for anyone to state: “the massacre as a locally planned and executed affair. While Brigham Young was not responsible for providing a proximal cause, I think it is fair to analyze how some of his actions and policies may have had unintended and indirect consequences for setting the stage.” It would be equally naïve for anyone to suggest there is a “smoking gun” or conclusive evidence that Brigham Young ordered the massacre at Mountain Meadows. People on both sides can lay out the same evidence and come to very different conclusions. If Young did order the massacre he along with the participants destroyed evidence and left an inconclusive trail. If he did not order the massacre, then he acted quite strange to the massacre and acted like a person who had a part in the massacre and cover-up.
We know, and historians across the board have admitted, Young did order people killed. All a person has to do is read Ardis Parshall’s “Pursue, Retake & Punish” or Wm MacKinnon’s “At Sword’s Point”.
Joe,
Thanks for your comment. Since my entries are so conspicuous around the ‘nacle for attracting so little discussion, I treasure the comments I do get.
I just read Stack’s old Tribune article and she quotes MacKinnon as making a similar observation about M@MM “properly” portraying a locally led event and Turley opining that Brigham’s rhetoric was not a proximate cause. So while I may be naive, I do not think the authors of M@MM are.
I agree with you that it is naive to believe there is conclusive evidence that Brigham ordered the massacre. I hope that I will be able to agree that historians who believe Brigham ordered the massacre do so because that is the most parsimonious (from their POV)way of accounting for all the evidence. But I confess I will probably be skeptical until someone publishes a response to the latest scholarship, which in my opinion is quite devastating to the Brigham-ordered-it theory.
This makes sense as a way of accounting for the lack of evidence implicating Brigham Young. However, I think one of the problems with conspiracy theories is that the very lack of evidence is often perceived as having evidential value. I am not saying that is how you are using your hypothetical.
I haven’t read “At Sword’s Point” yet, so I can’t comment. I vaguely remember some discussion of someone getting killed for desertion. Feel free to provide some specifics. I think Parshall’s article shows that Brigham prescribed extra-legal punishment for specified convicted criminals if they stole livestock on their way out of the territory. The Tobin shooting could be seen as an unintended and indirect consequence of an unfortunate Young policy. Looked at that way, it (arguably) amplifies the approach I took in my review with Young’s Indian policy.
The Tribune article by Peggy Fletcher Stack can be found here.
David, don’t forget MacKinnon also said, “They have also identified the impact of Gov. Brigham Young’s overheated rhetoric and provocative actions in helping to create a violent atmosphere in Utah leading up to the massacre.” “At Sword’s Point” is full of information about Young’s orders for lethal action.
As I have written before I have never been one to get into long protracted debates over these issues. I think it is only fair to point out the new book is not the answer to these problems. If one wants to believe it so, that is fine. But I think as an apologist it does the church no good to believe that way. The evidence is conclusive that Young ordered lethal action and Parshall did a great job in showing this side of Young. It is o.k. to ignore that evidence or write that it had unintended consequences, but the fact remains Young ordered lethal action.
Joe, those are good points. I actually agree with MacKinnon’s statement you quote. I hope to catch his lecture on the 25th if I can find a car pool from Provo or SLC.
I think that for the long haul, M@MM will be the best monograph apologists can recommend to members struggling with the issues. Individual needs like attention span, will vary, of course. For those who need more than M@MM offers, M@MM will still be useful as a launching point for further study.
I agree with you about the Parshall article, in that Brigham Young authorized lethal force. However when Parshall introduced it on Times and Seasons she characterized Brigham’s letter as being “ambiguous” (not conclusive as you suggest) on that point (see comment #6). I have several long comments critiquing the article there as well. Here, I was just trying to add some context on “that side” of Brigham Young, which appears to be different from the context facing the known MMM perps. Though not so different that cautious comparisons can’t be made.
http://www.timesandseasons.org/?p=3492#more-3492
When one is trying to prevent a lynch mob from acting precipitously, very often, it seems that that person is covering up for the guilty.
From the evidence, it seems obvious that Brigham Young was quite reluctant to see people being railroaded before all the evidence was in. Alan Dershowitz, in his book, “Reasonable Doubts,” calls it “Framing the guilty.” Denying obviously guilty people their rights makes it too convenient to do the same to those who are not.
What makes a situation fair is not whether the “right side” wins, but whether the rules are reasonable and consistently applied. It appears that this was Brigham Young’s goal.
Note, however, that once accurate information poured in, Brigham Young acted quickly and forcefully.
Thanks David. I have been told as you comment that Parshall seems to be hesitant about her conclusions in the UHQ article. Yet I heard her at MHA in Sacramento and she seemed to be quite sure about her article. I don’t have an answer. In Parshall’s article she makes a very important comment about the difference in letters that went to Aaron Johnson, John Butler and Louis Brunson versus the letters that went to Haight and Dame. She writes “Unlike the earlier letters [Johnson, Butler and Brunson],they did not state that a penalty was to be imposed only after the theft of the stock.” IOW’s, killing the men traveling south was no longer based on criminal action, Young had now given the freedom to murder innocent people.
Thanks for the link for Times and Seasons. As I read Parshall’s comments I had to wonder. Why did they not act as law enforcement and met in secret. The answer is Young gave them instructions to act the way they did. She also discusses how each leader interpreted the letter a bit different. I think one needs to ask why did the leaders interpret the letter in a violent way. Obviously the letters are violent in nature, but I think a more important question has to be asked. Why would these religious men not use their own moral fiber and say “No, I will not murder people”? At the SLC library a few weeks ago there was a panel discussion about MatMM. The Harvard scholar Dr. Faragher asks the question “why would ordinary people commit such an evil act?” I think we have a modern model. The former Yugoslavia and Milosevic’s reign of terror. For fifty years the people lived in relative peace as neighbors, then Milosevic started on his rhetoric about the Serbs and how the Muslims had persecuted the Serbs. In less than a decade Serbs were massacring the Muslims. Their own neighbors, people who they had spent their life loving.
Steven,
I am sure David is happy to have another person involved in the conversation. That way he doesn’t have to listen to me so much.:-)
Steven I would just caution you about Young waiting for the evidence to be gathered. This is Hamlin’s testimony at the second Lee trial. Remember Young and Smith’s depositions had not been entered as evidence at the first trial and it was after this disclosure of Hamblin’s that the depositions were then entered as evidence.
Question by Bishop: Have you ever given a report of [the massacre] to any of your superiors in the church, or officers over you?
Hamblin: Well, I did speak of it to President Young and George A. Smith.
Bishop: Did you give them the whole facts?
Hamblin: I gave them more than I have here, because I recollected more of it.
Bishop: When did you do that?
Hamblin: Pretty soon after it happened.
Bishop: You are certain that you gave it fuller than you have told it here on the stand?
Hamblin: I told everything I could . . .
Hamblin then appears to say he has even more to tell but didn’t or won’t. With Hamblin saying he told Young and Smith the details, Lee says he told Young the details and Klingensmith says he told Young the details, it appears that Young knew the details pretty early on. Also both Carleton and Cradlebaugh had the details and those involved a year and half after the massacre. These were two outsiders and they had the story right, Young being the most powerful person in the Territory and not knowing the truth is for me unbelievable.
Sorry about my late responses. Joe, what you are telling about a second letter is news to me. I will look into it (and “At Sword’s Point”) and adjust my position accordingly. As historians say “Trust, but Verify!”
Steven,
Thanks for you observation about Brigham Young. Setting aside the question of how much Brigham Young knew (and I recognize that Joe has made some good points in defending his position), I think that Young had conflicts of interest. His concern for the rights of the accused was apparent when he negotiated with federal prosecutors to get a fair venue for a trial, (the feds dropped the ball on that one). Young had family obligations to look out for JDL, he had to be prepared in case he was tried as a co-defendant, he had a responsibility to look out for his constituents in general (for example Carleton advocated Mormon genocide as the appropriate response to the MMM), he had to worry about violating priest/confessor confidentiality, and he had to worry about complying with Cummings’ amnesty for Utah war crimes.
David,
I wanted to say that I have always enjoyed your posts. This has been one of my favorite discussions and I appreciate your knowledge. I hope you enjoy “At Sword’s Point” as much as I have. If you want to do a blog on it after you read it I may be able to get Bill MacKinnon to come on and give us some of his thoughts.
Joe,
The new Turley, et al. book on MMM implies that, once the facts were known, Brigham Young advocated that the feds move quickly on trying the perps. Twenty years after the fact to try John Lee is WAY too long.
Hamblin isn’t clear (at least in your quote of the transcript) just how soon “Pretty soon” was. This may cloud just how much “cover-up” Brigham Young actually did.
David,
If Brigham Young actually ordered the MMM, I can understand a federal extermination order against the Saints. However, there is no direct evidence for it, and much against it.
In Bagley’s “Blood of the Prophets” he writes, “Jacob Hamblin later testified he reported the part white men had played at Mountain Meadows to Brigham Young and George A. Smith soon after the massacre took place, apparently when the men met on 18 June 1858”. This is from Chapter 12 which details the initial investigations by Young, Smith, Cradlebaugh and Carleton. It is great reading and I highly recommend it.
I will disagree. Extermination of the Mormons would have been as evil no matter what evidence surfaced. Committing one crime for punishment of another is still evil. The only people who should have paid a price were those responsible. Cradlebaugh seemed to have found those people and wanted to prosecute them. Unfortunately his life was in danger because of his investigation and the U.S. troop withdrawal left him fearing for his life. Carleton’s statement on extermination comes from a man who had a history of over violent treatments when it came to dealing with people. His treatment of the Navajo’s is a good example.
Cradlebaugh’s life wasn’t in danger. He wanted a military escort to frighten Provo residents during his grand jury investigation and the U.S. District Attorney, Gov. Cummings and A.S. Johnston disagreed. One soldier’s diary (Tracy) notes Cradlebaugh’s suspension of the grand jury at Johnston’s orders. Cradlebaugh came into conflict with U.S. District Attorney Wilson, who didn’t want to convene a grand jury for the massacre in 1858.
Hamblin’s testimony at the trial wherein he claimed to report Lee’s confession to Young, I think, was a lie or perhaps an exaggeration. There is no corroboration of that interview with Young. Hamblin doesn’t record the 1857 encounter with Lee in any of his writings and didn’t provide the information to Carleton. Plus, Hamblin’s trial testimony is unbelievable.
Hamblin’s testimony is very problematic. Lee’s attorney Bishop conceded to the jury that Hamblin’s testimony was to be believed. Lee wrote privately that Hamblin was a liar. Hamblin’s biographers go to lengths to argue that Hamblin wasn’t lying, which means that there must be something to the charge.
When Hamblin said he had more to tell at the trial, it is a wonder that none of the attorneys followed up. Not Bishop. Not Sumner. Not the judge. These chose not to do so.
But, suppose Young knew the details after the fact? What was he supposed to do? He wasn’t in political power any more. Moreover, he offered a Mormon territorial marshal to the U.S. Marshal’s office with a promise that the Mormon would arrest the perpetrators, and the government refused the offer on the ground that the territorial marshal was “a Mormon.”
Robert,
Thanks for chiming in. I enjoyed your article I linked to in my footnote [9]. When it first came out, it rekindled my interest in the aftermath of the MMM.
I haven’t thought to question Hamblin’s credibility at the trial, beyond it being a problematic late recollection. In 1858, I don’t think that Brigham would have necesarily accepted Hamblin’s word over whatever he had heard from Lee himself. According to Wilford Woodruff, Lee’s initial report to Young on Sept 29, 1857, blamed the massacre entirely on the Indians, but indicated he (Lee) had led the burial party.
There really are no historians who agree with my theory that Hamblin exaggerated except for Bagley. Bagley says, with no evidence, that Hamblin was ordered to lie by Brigham Young to ensure that Lee was convicted and scapegoated I say he exaggerated or lied because of the facts I cite above.
I have been looking into At Sword’s Point, but have read only the two chapters that are most descriptive of extra-legal violent episodes, especially the “Lonely Bones” one.
However, I am still perplexed by the statement “Young did order people killed.” On page 324 of ASP, in the midst of an essay covering Young’s communication prior and during the Utah War in conjunction with violent episodes, MacKinnon wrote “These authorizations targeted U.S. troops, civilian mountaineers, and other non-combatants. That none of these communications can be linked to a specific killing — and they have not been — does not mean that they had no effect.”
The debate over whether Brigham ordered it or not has been going on since early 1858. There was a bigger massacre, the largest in the western expansion of the United States. It occurred near Preston Idaho, known today as the Bear River Massacre. Brigham did not order it, soldiers committed it, but Peter Maughan declared it God’s will. Brigham excommunicated one who was with the soldiers, and did not validate Maughan’s words.
here was a bigger massacre, the largest in the western expansion of the United States. It occurred near Preston Idaho, known today as the Bear River Massacre. Brigham did not order it, soldiers committed it, but Peter Maughan declared it God’s will. Brigham excommunicated one who was with the soldiers, and did not validate Maughan’s words.
Interesting how that one has faded away so.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bear_River_Massacre
I know this is an old discussion, but I just found it (through the wonders of Google Alerts). Since my article and my conclusions were discussed, may I respond despite the lateness? I’d rather not be misinterpreted by third parties.
I believe that what I called the Tobin ambush was traceable to Brigham Young, because he wrote the two letters that I believe were used by southern Utahns to justify the ambush. He may be responsible for the ambush in that limited sense. And I also believe that some of the later violence, including Mountain Meadows, would not have occurred had Brigham Young taken decisive action after the Tobin ambush to lay down the law, in no uncertain terms, that such local actions were not justified.
However, I do not believe that Brigham Young ever intended the ambush to occur as it did: he had specific prerequisites in mind (stock theft) that did not take place; since his conditions were not met, his consequences should not have been implemented. And of course the ambush as it actually played out didn’t even involve the men who were threatened by Brigham Young. But even had Betts and Ambrose been camping with Tobin that night, Brigham Young did not intend them to be attacked since they had not committed the crimes he warned against.
It is true, as Joe said, that I called the second letter (February 6) “ambiguous” — but only in this limited sense: When Brigham Young dictated letters to multiple correspondents during a short space of time, he very often covered the same general news in each letter (weather, crops, buildings, news received from other correspondents). But with each letter, his general news got progressively briefer — he may have referred to the same topics, but he left out more and more details with each retelling. The second (February 6) letter would have been ambiguous to those who received it in southern Utah, because they would have had no way of knowing what Brigham Young had written to leaders in central Utah. They couldn’t possibly have known the details BY left out concerning the prerequisites to killing. But BY’s intentions were not at all ambiguous to himself — he meant the same thing by the second letter as he had meant by the first letter, and there is no sinister change of intent in his characteristic but (in this case) regrettable failure to repeat himself at length.
I think Brigham Young was operating on a different set of principles than we expect from governors today. But BY’s principles were consistent: His first loyalty was always to the Kingdom of God. He did not consider his authority to have come from Washington. He was bound by laws, but not necessarily laws issued by Congress.
Other authors, including some who have used my Tobin research in their own writing, don’t have the same understanding. I’m not responsible for their conclusions, though. One major reason for writing the story of the Tobin ambush — my only published journal article, after all — was to tell the story the way I believed it had happened. Had I merely turned my research over to someone else, anyone else, I would not have liked the results. It would be too easy for the tale to have been sensationalized far beyond what the record would support. But since I was the first to tell it, anybody coming later would have to demonstrate where I had got the story wrong. Or so I thought. It turns out, though, as suggested by some commenters, that I was wrong about that, and that my conclusions are in some doubt. They should not be.
Thanks for entertaining a late entry in the discussion.
Ardis, your comment is much appreciated. Thanks for your clarification.